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Introduction	   	  	  It	  is	  good	  to	  be	  virtuous.	  	  But	  there	  are	  different	  types	  of	  virtues.	  They	  differ	  in	  the	  types	  of	  ends	  they	  are	  valued	  relative	  to.	  For	  example,	  whereas	  compassion	  is	  widely	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  virtue	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  one	  might	  judged	  to	  be	  a	  good	  person,	  open-­‐mindedness	  is	  valued	  for	  making	  one	  a	  good	  knower.	  	  Other	  virtues,	  like	  persistence,	  can’t	  easily	  be	  categorized	  as	  either	  moral	  or	  epistemic	  because	  they	  make	  us	  both	  good	  persons	  and	  good	  knowers.	  I’m	  interested	  in	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  case	  in	  which	  virtues	  count	  as	  both	  moral	  and	  epistemic.	  In	  the	  case	  I	  am	  interested	  in,	  virtues	  that	  are	  more	  often	  thought	  to	  be	  moral	  virtues	  turn	  out	  to	  also	  play	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  role.	  Having	  good	  character,	  I	  want	  to	  show,	  can	  make	  one	  a	  better	  perceiver	  and	  in	  turn	  a	  better	  knower.	  	  The	  specific	  type	  of	  knowledge	  that	  I’m	  interested	  in	  is	  knowledge	  about	  another	  person’s	  character.	  I	  want	  to	  show	  that	  cultivating	  virtuous	  moral	  character	  can	  make	  us	  better	  perceivers	  of	  the	  moral	  character	  of	  others.	  One	  way	  to	  be	  a	  better	  perceiver	  of	  something	  involves	  being	  better	  at	  seeing	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  qualities	  that	  are	  distinctive	  of	  it	  qua	  the	  type	  of	  thing	  that	  it	  is.	  Virtues	  are	  character	  traits	  that	  are	  set	  apart	  from	  other	  character	  traits	  at	  least	  in	  part	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  positive	  value.	  Insofar	  as	  a	  trait	  like	  courage	  is	  a	  virtue	  then,	  part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  courageous	  is	  to	  have	  a	  valuable	  trait.	  Here,	  I	  argue	  that	  emotions	  play	  a	  perceptual	  or	  quasi-­‐perceptual	  role	  in	  representing	  virtue	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  character	  helps	  us	  to	  have	  the	  right	  emotional	  responses	  to	  the	  virtuous	  character	  of	  others.	  	  The	  argument	  is	  developed	  in	  four	  stages.	  Section	  one	  presents	  the	  view	  that	  emotions	  give	  us	  a	  kind	  of	  perceptual	  or	  quasi-­‐perceptual	  access	  to	  evaluative	  properties.	  Section	  two	  discusses	  the	  specific	  category	  of	  esteeming	  emotions,	  which	  some	  philosophers	  have	  argued	  represent	  that	  toward	  which	  they	  are	  felt	  as	  having	  positive	  value.	  Some	  studies	  show	  that	  we	  esteem	  people	  when	  we	  recognize	  that	  they	  have	  virtuous	  character	  traits.	  Assuming	  that	  virtuous	  character	  traits	  are	  traits	  that	  have	  positive	  value,	  in	  esteeming	  in	  respect	  of	  good	  character	  we	  represent	  those	  character	  traits	  to	  be	  virtues.	  Section	  three	  grounds	  this	  in	  a	  realist	  account	  of	  value	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  naturalist	  account	  of	  the	  perception	  of	  that	  value.	  Sections	  four	  and	  five	  discuss	  the	  epistemic	  role	  that	  the	  perceiver’s	  character	  can	  play	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  perceive	  virtue.	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   1. Emotion	  and	  perception	  	  Emotion	  and	  perception	  share	  enough	  relevant	  similarities	  that	  some	  propose	  emotion	  to	  be	  a	  type	  of	  perceptual	  or	  quasi-­‐perceptual	  state.1	  According	  to	  the	  perceptual	  view	  of	  emotion,	  just	  as	  vision	  is	  a	  modality	  sensitive	  to	  color	  and	  hearing	  for	  sound	  and	  pitch,	  emotions	  are	  a	  perceptual	  modality	  sensitive	  to	  evaluative	  properties,	  properties	  that	  evaluate	  in	  a	  normative,	  prudential	  or	  aesthetic	  way.	  Some	  might	  have	  found	  this	  initially	  counter-­‐intuitive	  since	  there	  isn’t	  a	  specific	  perceptual	  organ	  devoted	  to	  emotion.	  And	  unlike	  perceptual	  experiences	  in	  other	  modalities	  such	  as	  vision,	  emotions	  often	  depend	  on	  other	  perceptual	  experiences.	  Being	  afraid	  of	  a	  spider	  in	  the	  shower	  depends	  on	  your	  experience	  of	  the	  spider.	  Nonetheless,	  perception	  and	  emotion	  share	  some	  important	  commonalities,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  want	  to	  call	  them	  perceptions	  proper,	  emotions	  are	  similar	  enough	  in	  the	  relevant	  ways	  to	  play	  an	  epistemic	  role	  akin	  to	  perceptual	  experiences.	  	  For	  instance,	  emotions	  are	  intentional	  states,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  emotions	  represent	  what	  they	  are	  directed	  toward	  as	  being	  some	  way.	  They	  are	  assessable	  for	  accuracy.	  A	  common	  view	  among	  philosophers	  of	  emotion,	  is	  that	  emotions	  represent	  what	  they	  are	  directed	  toward	  as	  having	  some	  evaluative	  property.	  Fear	  evaluates	  what	  it	  is	  felt	  toward	  as	  being	  dangerous,	  disgust	  evaluates	  it’s	  object	  as	  corrupt.	  But	  we	  typically	  recognize	  just	  two	  categories	  of	  intentional	  mental	  states:	  perceptions	  and	  cognitive	  states	  (beliefs,	  judgments).	  And	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  other	  functional	  profiles	  of	  emotions,	  they	  resemble	  perceptions	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  they	  do	  cognitive	  states.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  emotions	  more	  closely	  resemble	  perceptual	  than	  cognitive	  states	  can	  be	  brought	  out	  by	  considering	  the	  category	  of	  irrational	  emotions.2	  Irrational	  emotions	  are	  those	  that	  persist	  even	  while	  we	  have	  beliefs	  that	  the	  object	  they	  are	  directed	  toward	  does	  not	  have	  whatever	  evaluative	  property	  the	  emotion	  represents	  the	  object	  to	  have.	  Phobias	  are	  one	  example.	  The	  arachnophobe	  may	  continue	  to	  feel	  terrified	  of	  an	  ordinary	  house	  spider	  despite	  knowing	  that	  the	  house	  spider	  poses	  no	  threat.	  And	  this	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  way	  that,	  in	  the	  Muller-­‐Lyer	  illusion,	  our	  visual	  experience	  of	  the	  two	  lines	  as	  being	  unequal	  lengths	  persists	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  know	  the	  lines	  are	  the	  same	  length.	  If	  emotions	  were	  belief-­‐like	  rather	  than	  perception-­‐like,	  we	  would	  expect	  irrational	  emotions	  to	  resolve	  once	  we	  come	  to	  the	  contrary	  belief	  that	  the	  object	  doesn’t	  actually	  have	  the	  evaluative	  property	  that	  we	  experience	  it	  to	  have.	  In	  fact,	  emotions	  do	  persist	  despite	  changes	  in	  evidence	  and	  background	  beliefs,	  at	  least	  far	  more	  frequently	  than	  beliefs	  do.	  	  Emotions	  also	  seem	  to	  play	  the	  same	  role	  as	  perceptual	  experiences	  in	  causing	  evaluative	  beliefs,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  providing	  their	  contents.	  For	  instance,	  moral	  beliefs	  are	  often	  accompanied	  by	  motivations	  to	  act	  in	  certain	  ways.	  This	  makes	  sense	  if	  moral	  beliefs	  are	  in	  many	  cases	  caused	  by	  emotions	  since	  emotions,	  but	  not	  beliefs,	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are	  thought	  to	  be	  inherently	  motivational.	  We	  wouldn’t	  expect	  moral	  beliefs	  that	  aren’t	  accompanied	  by	  emotions	  to	  have	  the	  same	  motivational	  force.	  Evidence	  about	  moral	  motivation	  from	  people	  who	  rate	  high	  in	  psychopathic	  traits	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  difference	  in	  motivation.	  Those	  with	  such	  traits	  have	  emotional	  deficits,	  and	  particularly	  with	  ‘moral	  emotions’	  such	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  feel	  empathy	  for	  others.	  And	  people	  lacking	  in	  these	  emotions	  have	  difficulty	  forming	  their	  own	  moral	  beliefs.	  When	  they	  do,	  they	  rely	  on	  other	  means	  such	  as	  testimony.	  But	  even	  though	  psychopathic	  people	  can	  profess	  to	  have	  moral	  beliefs,	  when	  they	  do	  they	  are	  not	  typically	  motivated	  by	  them.3	  Presumably	  this	  is	  because	  these	  beliefs	  do	  not	  have	  their	  typical	  emotional	  causal	  source.	  	  	  People	  high	  in	  psychopathic	  traits	  also	  have	  problems	  grasping	  moral	  concepts	  such	  as	  ‘right’	  and	  ‘wrong’.4	  For	  instance,	  psychopathic	  individuals	  have	  difficulty	  drawing	  the	  distinction	  between	  moral	  wrongs	  and	  mere	  conventional	  wrongs.	  5	  Moral	  wrongs	  are	  those	  that	  cause	  harm	  to	  individuals	  whereas	  conventional	  harms	  involve	  mere	  violations	  of	  social	  norms.	  Most	  people	  easily	  make	  distinctions	  between	  moral	  wrongs	  and	  mere	  conventional	  violations	  by	  early	  childhood,	  but	  psychopathic	  individuals	  take	  all	  wrongs	  to	  be	  of	  the	  conventional	  sort.	  It	  is	  thought	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  so	  called	  ‘moral’	  emotions	  is	  what	  underlies	  the	  psychopathic	  person’s	  inability	  to	  grasp	  the	  moral	  understanding	  of	  ‘right’	  and	  ‘wrong’.	  If	  emotions	  cause	  and	  provide	  some	  of	  the	  evaluative	  content	  for	  our	  moral	  beliefs,	  then	  it	  would	  make	  sense	  that	  those	  with	  psychopathic	  traits	  have	  the	  cognitive	  deficits	  regarding	  moral	  beliefs	  that	  they	  have.	  The	  difficulties	  that	  psychopathic	  individuals	  have	  with	  grasping	  and	  using	  moral	  concepts	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  analogous	  to	  the	  difficulty	  that	  colorblind	  people	  have	  with	  color	  concepts.6	  	  	  The	  role	  of	  emotion	  in	  causing	  and	  providing	  content	  for	  evaluative	  beliefs	  is	  also	  demonstrated	  in	  work	  by	  Haidt	  and	  colleagues.7	  	  In	  one	  study	  they	  asked	  subjects	  to	  judge	  whether	  it	  was	  morally	  acceptable	  for	  a	  brother	  and	  sister	  to	  have	  sex	  on	  vacation	  if	  all	  of	  the	  potential	  negative	  consequences	  were	  mitigated	  (i.e.	  they	  use	  birth	  control,	  don’t	  tell	  anyone…).	  Even	  when	  subjects	  were	  not	  able	  to	  point	  out	  any	  reasons	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  for	  the	  brother	  and	  sister	  to	  have	  sex,	  subjects	  almost	  always	  claimed	  that	  it	  was	  still	  wrong.8	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  the	  reaction	  of	  disgust	  that	  causes	  subjects	  to	  make	  the	  moral	  evaluation	  that	  they	  do	  and	  that	  the	  content	  of	  the	  emotion	  of	  disgust	  also	  explains	  the	  content	  of	  the	  subjects’	  moral	  evaluations.	  Moreover,	  this	  study	  reveals	  that,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  perception,	  people	  trust	  the	  deliverance	  of	  their	  emotional	  experience	  even	  when	  they	  don’t	  have	  cognitive	  sources	  of	  support	  for	  their	  beliefs	  such	  as	  other	  beliefs.	  The	  fact	  that	  people	  lacked	  evidence	  in	  the	  form	  of	  beliefs	  for	  their	  moral	  judgments	  did	  not	  have	  any	  bearing	  on	  their	  faith	  in	  them.	  And	  this	  suggests	  that	  we	  afford	  emotions	  and	  other	  perceptions	  a	  similar	  epistemic	  role	  as	  basic	  evidential	  sources	  in	  justifying	  our	  moral	  beliefs.	  	  I	  think	  this	  suffices	  to	  show	  that	  emotions	  are	  intentional	  experiences	  that	  play	  an	  analogous	  role	  to	  other	  perceptual	  experiences	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  beliefs.	  For	  instance,	  emotions	  are	  sensitive	  to	  evaluative	  properties,	  which	  they	  give	  us	  experiential	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awareness	  of.	  They	  also	  seem	  to	  cause	  and	  provide	  content	  for	  our	  evaluative	  beliefs	  about	  their	  intentional	  objects	  and	  this	  suggests	  that	  they	  might	  well	  be	  considered	  adequate	  justification	  for	  those	  beliefs.	  The	  next	  section	  focuses	  on	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  esteeming	  emotions.9	  	  	   2. Esteem	  as	  the	  representation	  of	  value	  	  Esteeming	  emotions	  are	  often	  directed	  toward	  people	  we	  admire	  and	  respect.	  They	  vary	  in	  intensity	  and	  quality	  and	  include:	  fondness,	  liking,	  caring	  for,	  and	  loving	  as	  well	  as	  others.	  Among	  philosophers	  who	  discuss	  emotions,	  there	  is	  a	  tradition	  of	  taking	  esteeming	  emotions	  to	  evaluate	  objects	  they	  are	  felt	  toward	  to	  have	  value.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  On	  the	  Origin	  of	  Right	  and	  Wrong,	  Franz	  Brentano	  claimed	  that	  love	  and	  hate	  are	  ways	  of	  experiencing	  the	  goodness	  and	  badness	  of	  perceptual	  objects.	  	   “We	  call	  a	  thing	  good	  when	  the	  love	  relating	  to	  it	  is	  correct.	  In	  the	  broadest	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  the	  good	  is	  that	  which	  is	  worthy	  of	  love,	  that	  which	  can	  be	  loved	  with	  a	  love	  that	  is	  correct.”10	  	  Later,	  in	  The	  Foundation	  and	  Construction	  of	  Ethics,	  he	  writes,	  	  “When	  we	  call	  certain	  objects	  good	  and	  others	  bad	  we	  are	  merely	  saying	  that	  whoever	  loves	  the	  former	  and	  hates	  the	  latter	  has	  taken	  the	  right	  stand.”11	  	  David	  Velleman,	  in	  Love	  as	  a	  Moral	  Emotion,	  claims	  that	  love	  is	  the	  proper	  experience	  when	  confronted	  with	  the	  dignity	  of	  another,	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  intrinsic	  value	  particular	  to	  persons.	  	   “I	  am	  inclined	  to	  say	  that	  love	  is	  likewise	  the	  awareness	  of	  a	  value	  inhering	  in	  its	  object;	  and	  I	  am	  inclined	  to	  describe	  love	  as	  an	  arresting	  awareness	  of	  that	  value.”12	  	  Graham	  Oddie	  follows	  this	  tradition	  in	  Value,	  Reality	  and	  Desire,	  nominating	  desire	  as	  the	  source	  of	  value	  data	  but	  adds	  that	  emotions	  either	  involve	  desire	  or	  can	  be	  analyzed	  entirely	  in	  terms	  of	  desire.	  	   “It	  is	  plausible	  that	  emotions	  all	  have	  a	  desirative	  component;	  so	  the	  value	  theory	  of	  experience	  I	  am	  advocating	  here	  can	  happily	  appropriate	  the	  insights	  of	  the	  broad	  tradition	  which	  identifies	  a	  particular	  emotion	  or	  emotions	  in	  general	  as	  a	  source	  of	  value	  data….experiencing	  the	  value	  of	  a	  person	  might	  take	  the	  form	  of	  loving	  rather	  than	  desiring	  (although	  as	  we	  will	  see	  the	  nature	  of	  love	  might	  be	  analyzed	  in	  terms	  of	  desire.)”13	  	  	  I	  follow	  this	  tradition	  in	  taking	  esteem	  to	  be	  a	  way	  of	  finding	  value	  in	  the	  object	  of	  our	  esteem.	  One	  trait	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  persons	  become	  objects	  of	  our	  esteem	  is	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for	  their	  character.	  That	  we	  like	  people	  with	  good	  character	  seems	  intuitively	  correct.	  Moreover,	  this	  makes	  evolutionary	  sense	  since	  most	  virtues	  are	  pro-­‐social	  traits	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  a	  person	  would	  be	  a	  valuable	  ally	  or	  mate.	  But	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  intuitive	  and	  theoretical	  reasons,	  empirical	  studies	  confirm	  that	  we	  tend	  to	  like	  people	  when	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  virtuous.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  one	  study	  by	  Lewandowski	  et	  al.14,	  individuals	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  a	  series	  of	  positive,	  negative	  and	  neutral	  character	  traits	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  desirability.	  The	  rated	  traits	  were	  then	  paired	  with	  photographs	  of	  random	  people.	  In	  this	  latter	  condition	  the	  subjects	  were	  asked,	  “how	  much	  would	  you	  like	  to	  be	  friends	  with	  this	  person”	  and	  “how	  much	  would	  you	  like	  to	  date	  this	  person”.	  Positive	  trait	  information	  was	  highly	  correlated	  with	  desire	  for	  friendship	  and	  then	  dating.	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  we	  want	  to	  be	  friends	  with	  people	  whom	  we	  like	  and	  that	  esteem	  for	  a	  subject	  also	  leads	  us	  to	  find	  them	  to	  be	  more	  attractive	  as	  dating	  partners.	  	  	  In	  a	  similar	  study	  by	  Knitten	  et.	  al.15,	  members	  of	  a	  rowing	  team	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  each	  other	  on	  a	  0-­‐99	  scale	  for	  talent,	  effort,	  liking	  and	  physical	  attractiveness	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  conclusion	  of	  an	  18	  month	  period	  over	  which	  teammates	  got	  to	  know	  one	  another	  through	  training	  and	  competition.	  Ratings	  of	  physical	  attractiveness,	  talent,	  effort,	  liking	  and	  respect	  were	  all	  highly	  correlated.	  Better	  ‘team	  players’	  received	  better	  ratings	  on	  all	  of	  the	  measures.	  The	  same	  correlations	  were	  found	  in	  a	  follow-­‐up	  study	  in	  which	  students	  in	  an	  archaeology	  course	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  one	  another	  both	  before	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  course	  on	  familiarity,	  intelligence,	  effort,	  liking	  and	  physical	  attractiveness.	  The	  same	  correlations	  were	  found	  in	  this	  study.	  Here,	  a	  woman	  who	  was	  uncooperative	  and	  lazy	  was	  universally	  disliked	  and	  a	  woman	  who	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  hardworking	  was	  universally	  liked.	  	  What	  I’m	  proposing	  is	  that	  esteeming	  emotions	  are	  perception-­‐like	  states	  that	  represent	  what	  they	  are	  directed	  toward	  as	  being	  valuable.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  persons,	  one	  of	  the	  traits	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  we	  esteem	  someone	  is	  for	  their	  good	  character.	  And	  in	  liking	  people	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  good	  character,	  we	  take	  the	  traits	  and	  the	  people	  who	  possess	  them	  to	  be	  good.	  	  	   3. Naturalism	  and	  value	  perception	  	  We	  can	  be	  better	  or	  worse	  at	  perceiving.	  One	  way	  to	  be	  a	  better	  perceiver	  of	  something	  involves	  representing	  it	  in	  more	  detail.	  The	  ideal	  case	  involves	  representing	  it	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  specific	  qualities	  that	  are	  distinctive	  to	  it	  qua	  the	  type	  of	  thing	  that	  it	  is.	  Virtues	  are	  character	  traits	  that	  are	  distinguished	  at	  least	  in	  part	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  positive	  value.	  So	  representing	  virtuous	  traits	  as	  valuable,	  as	  when	  we	  feel	  esteem	  for	  others	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  moral	  courage,	  is	  one	  way	  of	  being	  better	  perceivers	  of	  those	  traits.	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This	  claim	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  character	  traits	  can	  have	  real	  value	  and	  that	  in	  esteeming	  a	  person	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  virtue	  we	  are	  put	  into	  contact	  with	  that	  value.	  On	  a	  widespread	  picture,	  perception	  involves	  being	  put	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  perceptible	  feature	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  via	  a	  process	  that	  reliably	  tracks	  that	  feature.	  Moreover,	  the	  epistemic	  value	  of	  perception	  depends	  on	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  process	  and	  that	  is	  usually	  grounded	  in	  a	  causal	  relation	  between	  the	  represented	  property	  and	  an	  experience	  that	  represents	  the	  property.	  So	  if	  emotion	  really	  is	  epistemically	  on	  par	  with	  other	  modes	  of	  perception,	  then	  there	  should	  be	  an	  account	  of	  value	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  naturalism.	  And	  since	  causation	  is	  involved,	  it	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  an	  account	  that	  locates	  value	  in	  the	  material	  nature	  of	  the	  perceptual	  object.	  Moreover,	  the	  causal	  process	  leading	  from	  the	  evaluative	  property	  in	  the	  object	  to	  the	  perceiver’s	  emotional	  response	  should	  enable	  us	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  perceiver	  has	  the	  emotional	  response	  that	  they	  have	  by	  appeal	  to	  the	  appropriate	  features	  of	  the	  object.	  	  Naturalist	  accounts	  of	  value	  are	  probably	  most	  familiarly	  attributed	  to	  those	  working	  within	  Aristotelian	  virtue	  traditions	  such	  as	  Hursthouse	  and	  Foot.16	  This	  is	  the	  view	  that	  for	  every	  evaluative	  property	  there	  will	  ultimately	  be	  some	  material	  feature	  or	  set	  of	  material	  features	  that	  the	  evaluative	  property	  is	  determined	  by17.	  So	  whenever	  the	  material	  conditions	  for	  the	  evaluative	  property	  are	  present	  the	  evaluative	  property	  will	  be	  instantiated	  in	  virtue	  of	  those	  properties.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  virtue,	  one	  reasonable	  view	  is	  that	  the	  value	  of	  virtuous	  character	  traits	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  material	  features	  of	  the	  person	  and	  the	  behavioral	  manifestation	  of	  the	  character	  trait	  in	  question.	  It	  is	  these	  material	  features	  that	  our	  responses	  of	  esteem	  track,	  and	  that	  determine	  the	  value	  that	  our	  esteem	  represents.	  	  A	  reliable	  causal	  process	  between	  those	  material	  conditions	  for	  the	  evaluative	  property	  and	  our	  emotional	  response	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  appeal	  to	  the	  emotion’s	  ‘cognitive	  base’.18	  According	  to	  Deonna	  and	  Teroni,	  the	  cognitive	  base	  of	  an	  emotion	  includes	  any	  mental	  states	  that	  act	  as	  reasons	  for	  the	  emotion	  including	  perceptual	  representations	  of	  the	  person	  and	  his	  or	  her	  virtuous	  actions.	  These	  perceptual	  representations	  will	  themselves	  be	  reliable.	  The	  cognitive	  base	  acts	  as	  a	  causal	  intermediary	  between	  the	  value	  in	  the	  perceptual	  object	  and	  our	  emotional	  response	  to	  it.	  Moreover,	  the	  cognitive	  base	  not	  only	  causes	  the	  emotional	  response	  but	  it	  also	  supplies	  the	  emotion	  with	  its	  intentional	  properties;	  the	  fear	  we	  experience	  is	  about	  the	  spider,	  the	  perception	  of	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  our	  fear.	  When	  we	  perceive	  an	  act	  of	  compassion	  and	  respond	  with	  favorable	  feelings	  of	  esteem,	  the	  esteem	  is	  directed	  toward	  the	  action	  and	  actor	  whose	  behavior	  we	  have	  perceived	  and	  the	  emotion	  is	  correct	  when	  the	  object	  that	  is	  provided	  by	  way	  of	  the	  cognitive	  base	  exemplifies	  the	  evaluative	  property	  that	  the	  emotion	  represents	  it	  to	  have.19	  	  	  What	  I	  am	  claiming	  is	  that	  we	  perceive	  the	  virtue	  of	  another	  when	  we	  respond	  to	  manifestations	  of	  virtuous	  character	  by	  liking	  the	  person	  in	  respect	  of	  that	  character.	  Perceiving	  character	  traits	  as	  valuable	  is	  a	  way	  of	  taking	  them	  to	  be	  virtues.	  And	  perceiving	  a	  virtue	  as	  a	  virtue	  is	  a	  way	  of	  more	  clearly	  seeing	  that	  character	  trait	  for	  what	  it	  is.	  The	  better	  we	  get	  at	  this	  the	  better	  epistemic	  position	  
	   7	  
we	  are	  in	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  others.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  concerns	  the	  epistemic	  role	  that	  cultivating	  good	  character	  can	  play	  in	  making	  perceivers	  into	  better	  perceivers,	  and	  perhaps	  better	  knowers,	  about	  the	  character	  of	  the	  people	  we	  encounter.	  	  	   4. Character	  and	  virtue	  	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  esteeming	  someone	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  character	  can	  be	  a	  way	  of	  recognizing	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  character.	  Now	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  cultivating	  virtuous	  character	  traits	  in	  ourselves	  can	  make	  us	  more	  sensitive	  perceivers	  of	  others’	  character.	  	  Although	  I	  have	  defined	  virtue	  as	  a	  type	  of	  character	  trait	  that	  is	  valuable,	  I	  have	  not	  said	  much	  about	  what	  character	  traits	  are.	  I	  take	  character	  traits	  to	  be	  relatively	  stable,	  enduring	  and	  coherent	  sets	  of	  related	  dispositions.	  For	  a	  disposition	  to	  be	  stable	  means	  that	  while	  it	  may	  not	  always	  manifest	  in	  the	  same	  behavior	  from	  situation	  to	  situation,	  one	  possessing	  the	  character	  trait	  will	  consistently	  exhibit	  behaviors	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  trait.	  An	  honest	  person	  may	  not	  tell	  the	  truth	  in	  every	  circumstance	  but	  will	  nonetheless	  behave	  in	  a	  way	  consistent	  with	  honesty	  by	  revealing	  as	  much	  of	  the	  truth	  as	  is	  appropriate	  to	  the	  circumstance.	  For	  a	  character	  trait	  to	  be	  enduring	  means	  that	  the	  person	  who	  possesses	  it	  will	  manifest	  a	  relatively	  fixed	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  that	  persists	  across	  the	  lifespan.	  I	  am	  not	  saying	  that	  character	  traits	  are	  unchangeable,	  but	  they	  are	  deeply	  ingrained.	  Finally,	  a	  person	  with	  a	  specific	  character	  trait	  will	  manifest	  a	  set	  of	  three	  types	  of	  dispositions	  for	  engaging	  with	  the	  world:	  They	  will	  be	  disposed	  to	  be	  perceptually	  attentive	  to	  and	  to	  apprehend	  situations	  a	  certain	  way,	  they	  will	  be	  disposed	  to	  feel	  and	  desire	  for	  certain	  things	  relative	  to	  each	  situation,	  and	  based	  on	  these	  emotions	  they	  will	  be	  disposed	  to	  behave	  in	  certain	  ways.	  	  Having	  a	  character	  trait	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  integrity	  among	  these	  different	  sets	  of	  dispositions	  insofar	  as	  different	  dispositions	  associated	  with	  each	  set	  will	  nonetheless	  reflect	  one	  in	  the	  same	  character	  trait.	  A	  person	  who	  has	  a	  virtuous	  character	  trait	  will	  therefore	  manifest	  these	  related	  dispositions	  with	  respect	  to	  that	  trait.	  The	  person	  will	  be	  disposed	  to	  notice	  aspects	  of	  their	  social	  and	  behavioral	  context	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  manifestation	  of	  the	  virtue	  and	  which	  call	  for	  a	  certain	  response.	  For	  instance,	  the	  courageous	  person	  will	  be	  attuned	  to	  situations	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  danger	  but	  will	  nonetheless	  notice	  where	  and	  which	  action	  is	  called	  for.	  The	  person	  will	  also	  be	  disposed	  to	  have	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  emotional	  response	  to	  those	  features	  of	  circumstances.	  For	  instance	  the	  virtue	  of	  courage	  involves	  not	  only	  experiencing	  the	  proper	  amount	  of	  fear	  to	  the	  circumstance	  but	  also	  having	  the	  desire	  for	  a	  certain	  end	  which	  the	  courageous	  recognizes	  as	  good.	  The	  third	  dispositional	  category	  concerns	  response	  and	  behavior.	  To	  be	  a	  courageous	  person	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  have	  the	  attentive	  and	  emotional	  dispositions	  particular	  to	  courage.	  The	  courageous	  person	  will	  not	  only	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feel	  the	  proper	  amount	  of	  fear,	  but	  she	  will	  act	  in	  spite	  of	  this	  fear	  in	  accord	  with	  her	  desired	  end.	  	  The	  psychological	  structure	  constituted	  by	  these	  related	  dispositions	  should	  also	  manifest	  in	  an	  appropriate	  attunement	  to,	  and	  responsiveness	  to,	  virtue	  in	  others.	  For	  instance,	  insofar	  as	  the	  virtuous	  agent	  is	  attentive	  to	  situations	  that	  call	  for	  virtuous	  responses	  in	  themself,	  they	  will	  be	  likely	  to	  recognize	  when	  virtuous	  responses	  are	  called	  for	  in	  others.	  And	  insofar	  as	  the	  virtuous	  agent	  knows	  which	  responses	  would	  be	  virtuous	  for	  them,	  they	  also	  knows	  which	  behaviors	  are	  required	  of	  others.	  For	  instance,	  the	  honest	  person	  will	  know	  when	  a	  situation	  calls	  for	  a	  person	  to	  reveal	  the	  truth	  and	  will	  be	  attuned	  to	  features	  that	  would	  distinguish	  a	  tactless	  comment	  from	  an	  honest	  one.	  Finally,	  as	  I	  mentioned,	  a	  person	  with	  the	  character	  structure	  associated	  with	  virtue	  will	  be	  disposed	  to	  have	  certain	  emotional	  responses	  consistent	  with	  virtue.	  Among	  these	  would	  be	  feelings	  of	  esteem	  and	  approval	  for	  virtuous	  behavior	  in	  others,	  and	  disapproval	  at	  the	  manifestations	  of	  vice.	  The	  honest	  person	  is	  disposed	  to	  esteem	  witnessed	  acts	  of	  honesty	  and	  will	  likewise	  regard	  dishonesty	  unfavorably.	  	  Crucially,	  notice	  that	  the	  perceptual	  attunement	  to	  virtuous	  behavior	  in	  others	  provides	  the	  perceptual	  component	  that	  becomes	  the	  cognitive	  base	  for	  the	  appropriate	  emotional	  response	  of	  esteem.	  For	  the	  possessor	  of	  a	  virtue,	  the	  affective	  response	  of	  esteem	  should	  arise	  naturally	  from	  the	  confrontation	  with	  the	  virtue	  in	  another.	  The	  esteem	  is	  directed	  toward	  the	  perceived	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  natural	  properties	  in	  them	  that	  manifest	  their	  virtuous	  acts.	  Those	  natural	  properties	  constitute	  the	  value	  that	  the	  virtuous	  perceiver,	  in	  esteeming	  the	  virtue	  of	  that	  person,	  represents	  that	  character	  trait	  to	  have.	  	  I	  am	  not	  saying	  that	  recognizing	  virtue	  in	  others	  requires	  that	  one	  possess	  the	  trait	  in	  question.	  There	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  come	  to	  know	  about	  virtue.	  Another	  way	  that	  we	  might	  recognize	  virtue	  is	  as	  a	  result	  of	  evaluative	  beliefs	  that	  we	  form	  through	  rational	  methods	  such	  as	  inference	  or	  testimony.	  For	  instance,	  one	  can	  come	  to	  believe	  through	  observing	  the	  testimony	  of	  others	  that	  dishonesty	  is	  morally	  problematic	  or	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  honesty	  consists	  in	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  behavior.	  These	  judgments	  can	  have	  top	  down	  influences	  on	  our	  emotional	  states,	  causing	  us	  to	  feel	  disapproval	  at	  dishonest	  actions	  or	  to	  feel	  esteem	  for	  honest	  people.	  But	  forming	  evaluative	  beliefs	  about	  character	  in	  a	  way	  that	  brings	  into	  play	  our	  own	  character,	  as	  on	  the	  model	  that	  I	  have	  described	  here,	  confers	  several	  advantages	  over	  the	  application	  of	  moral	  beliefs.	  Namely,	  it	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  character	  trait	  will	  be	  represented	  as	  virtues	  and	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reliability	  of	  those	  representations	  when	  they	  arise.	  	  Some	  have	  observed	  that	  normative	  judgments	  about	  value,	  specifically	  moral	  value,	  are	  intrinsically	  motivating	  and	  so	  depend	  in	  some	  sense	  on	  emotions.20	  In	  the	  strongest	  version	  of	  this	  view,	  what	  it	  is	  to	  make	  a	  moral	  judgment	  is	  just	  to	  have	  the	  appropriate	  feelings	  of	  approval	  or	  disapproval	  toward	  the	  intended	  target.	  On	  a	  weaker	  version	  of	  the	  view,	  moral	  judgments	  involve	  emotional	  dispositions.	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Although	  beliefs	  about	  virtue	  can	  influence	  us	  to	  have	  the	  appropriate	  emotional	  responses	  to	  virtue,	  developing	  moral	  beliefs	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  the	  corresponding	  emotion	  will	  be	  manifest.	  Recall	  that	  psychopaths	  appear	  to	  develop	  moral	  beliefs	  based	  on	  testimony.	  But	  they	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  the	  appropriate	  emotions	  to	  match	  these	  beliefs.	  The	  psychopath	  can	  categorize	  actions	  as	  right	  or	  wrong,	  and	  may	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  ‘wrong’	  to	  exploit	  other	  people	  but	  simultaneously	  feel	  no	  aversion	  to	  doing	  so.	  He	  or	  she	  lacks	  the	  motivational	  disposition	  that	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  moral	  judgments	  because	  they	  lack	  the	  required	  emotional	  representations.	  One	  might	  say	  that	  in	  these	  cases	  what	  appear	  like	  normative	  judgments	  are	  actually	  not	  genuine	  moral	  judgments	  at	  all.	  P	  possessing	  the	  character	  structure	  associate	  with	  virtue,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  one	  have	  the	  right	  emotional	  stances	  toward	  objects	  of	  moral	  evaluation	  and	  therefore	  it	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  one	  will	  recognize	  virtue	  as	  virtue	  when	  it	  is	  confronted.	  	  	  Moreover,	  which	  specific	  acts	  will	  count	  as	  virtuous	  or	  vicious	  is	  highly	  context	  dependent.	  21	  	  A	  behavior	  that	  might	  count	  as	  honest	  in	  one	  situation,	  may	  qualify	  as	  tactless	  in	  a	  different	  context.	  And	  as	  situations	  increase	  in	  complexity,	  it	  will	  be	  harder	  to	  accurately	  determine	  by	  application	  of	  rules	  and	  principles,	  which	  actions	  count	  as	  virtuous	  or	  vicious.	  This	  becomes	  particularly	  obvious	  as	  our	  cognitive	  resources	  become	  loaded	  by	  other	  demands	  or	  when	  we	  are	  pressured	  to	  make	  quick	  decisions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  insofar	  as	  character	  traits	  are	  associated	  with	  automatic	  dispositions,	  they	  are	  routinely	  taken	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  the	  complexities	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  context	  of	  practical	  action.	  And	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  emotional	  responses	  grounded	  in	  these	  dispositions	  will	  be	  more	  reliable	  both	  insofar	  as	  there	  will	  be	  an	  increased	  likelihood	  that	  they	  will	  arise	  when	  a	  virtuous	  trait	  is	  encountered,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  increasing	  the	  accuracy	  of	  these	  representations	  when	  they	  arise.	  	  	  	  	   5. Liking	  the	  vicious?	  	  In	  this	  final	  section,	  I	  want	  to	  discuss	  a	  potential	  counter-­‐example.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  we	  tend	  to	  esteem	  people	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  good	  character;	  in	  doing	  so	  we	  represent	  their	  character	  as	  valuable	  and	  so	  as	  virtuous.	  Furthermore,	  such	  cases	  count	  as	  providing	  perception-­‐like	  contact	  with	  virtue.	  And	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  cultivate	  good	  character	  in	  ourselves,	  we	  can	  also	  become	  better	  at	  detecting	  virtue	  in	  others.	  However,	  it	  might	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  people	  are	  often	  drawn	  to	  individuals	  with	  questionable	  character.	  If	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  people	  are	  as	  attracted	  to	  vice	  as	  much	  as	  to	  virtue,	  then	  esteem	  may	  not	  in	  the	  end	  provide	  the	  reliable	  kind	  of	  access	  to	  the	  value	  of	  character	  traits	  that	  the	  perceptual	  model	  advanced	  here	  requires.	  I	  will	  consider	  two	  versions	  of	  this	  counter-­‐example	  and	  argue	  that	  both	  cases	  actually	  lend	  support	  for	  the	  view	  I’ve	  developed,	  rather	  than	  evidence	  against	  it.	  	  One	  way	  of	  developing	  the	  counter-­‐example	  is	  to	  appeal	  to	  common	  cultural	  ideas	  about	  what	  people	  find	  appealing.	  Consider	  the	  common	  trope	  in	  film	  and	  popular	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culture	  of	  the	  outsider	  character,	  a	  ‘bad-­‐boy’.22	  These	  characters	  are	  outsiders	  to	  social	  norms,	  often	  norms	  regarding	  common	  morality.	  Moreover,	  the	  outsider	  archetype	  is	  simultaneously	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  sex	  symbol	  precisely	  on	  account	  of	  his	  or	  her	  outsider	  status.	  Although	  it	  isn’t	  entirely	  clear	  how	  heavily	  we	  want	  to	  rely	  on	  common	  tropes	  in	  the	  context	  of	  philosophical	  theory	  construction	  or	  disconfirmation,	  I	  nonetheless	  take	  it	  to	  count	  in	  a	  theory’s	  favor	  if	  it	  can	  help	  to	  make	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  cultural	  data.	  And	  the	  view	  that	  I	  have	  developed	  can	  do	  this.	  	  The	  first	  thing	  to	  point	  out	  about	  this	  counter-­‐example	  is	  that	  it	  rests	  on	  the	  false	  premise	  that	  when	  we	  like	  such	  characters,	  we	  like	  them	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  moral	  vices	  (though	  I	  will	  allow	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  we	  may	  like	  them	  in	  spite	  of	  them).	  Examples	  of	  characters	  who	  easily	  fit	  the	  example	  might	  include	  James	  Dean,	  Elvis	  Preseley,	  and	  Muhammad	  Ali.	  When	  we	  think	  of	  alluring	  rebels	  we	  do	  not	  think	  of	  people	  like	  Ted	  Bundy,	  or	  Joseph	  Stalin	  who	  would	  more	  aptly	  count	  as	  villains.	  An	  obvious	  difference	  between	  these	  sets	  is	  that,	  while	  the	  former	  are	  violators	  of	  social	  norms,	  the	  latter	  group	  consists	  in	  those	  who	  violate	  not	  merely	  social	  but	  also	  genuine	  and	  uncontroversial	  considered	  moral	  beliefs	  about	  right	  and	  wrong.	  We	  like	  those	  who	  defy	  social	  convention,	  particularly	  when	  those	  conventions	  stifle	  or	  impede	  genuine	  moral	  progress.	  Challenging	  social	  conventions	  also	  seems	  to	  employ	  virtues	  such	  as	  courage,	  authenticity	  and	  open-­‐mindedness.	  It	  is	  these	  qualities	  and	  not	  moral	  vices,	  I	  would	  suspect,	  we	  are	  drawn	  to	  in	  liking	  those	  who	  transgress	  social	  norms.	  	  But	  some	  have	  appealed	  to	  more	  scientific	  empirical	  findings	  to	  further	  argue	  that	  people	  are	  attracted	  to	  vice.	  23	  	  “Dark	  triad”	  personality	  styles,	  which	  include	  narcissism,	  psychopathy	  and	  Machiavellianism,	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  traits	  such	  as:	  callousness,	  deceit,	  exploitativeness,	  manipulativeness,	  entitlement	  and	  low	  empathy.	  And	  results	  of	  two	  types	  of	  studies	  seem	  to	  link	  these	  traits	  to	  increased	  desirability.	  In	  the	  first	  set	  of	  studies,	  photographs	  of	  people	  high	  in	  these	  traits	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  rated	  as	  more	  attractive	  than	  others	  low	  in	  these	  traits.	  In	  another	  set	  of	  studies,	  people	  rating	  high	  in	  these	  traits	  were	  shown	  as	  tending	  to	  have	  more	  sexual	  partners	  across	  their	  lifespan	  than	  people	  who	  rated	  lower	  in	  them.	  24	  	  	  In	  order	  for	  these	  empirical	  findings	  to	  support	  a	  counter-­‐example,	  they	  must	  support	  the	  view	  that	  the	  gains	  in	  mating	  success	  and	  desirability	  that	  the	  traits	  associated	  with	  the	  “dark	  triad”	  personality	  styles	  confer	  occur	  because	  those	  vicious	  traits	  themselves	  are	  the	  object	  of	  our	  esteem;	  the	  causal	  connection	  between	  the	  esteem	  felt	  for	  the	  person	  must	  align	  with	  the	  causal	  account	  about	  the	  perception	  of	  character	  that	  I	  have	  developed.	  	  But	  the	  empirical	  findings	  do	  not	  support	  that	  reading.	  Rather,	  when	  we	  look	  more	  comprehensively	  at	  what	  we	  know	  about	  the	  dark-­‐triad	  personalities,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  these	  traits	  facilitate	  desirability	  and	  mating	  success	  in	  quite	  a	  different	  way.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  vicious	  traits	  themselves	  that	  are	  the	  object	  of	  appeal.	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For	  instance,	  people	  who	  rate	  high	  in	  narcissism	  and	  psychopathy	  do	  tend	  to	  put	  more	  effort	  into	  physical	  presentation	  and	  grooming,	  on	  average.	  So	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  in	  photographs	  they	  would	  get	  higher	  ratings	  on	  attractiveness.	  In	  fact,	  when	  people	  are	  shown	  photographs	  of	  the	  same	  individuals	  without	  their	  self-­‐adornment,	  they	  are	  judged	  as	  no	  more	  physically	  attractive	  than	  typical	  subjects.	  25	  I	  think	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  here	  vicious	  traits	  are	  being	  represented	  as	  valuable.	  Rather,	  I	  think	  that	  if	  character	  traits	  are	  being	  tracked	  in	  these	  evaluations	  at	  all,	  they	  are	  value	  neutral	  traits	  such	  as	  vanity.	  But	  there	  is	  also	  overwhelming	  evidence	  that	  people	  with	  vicious	  personalities	  seek	  more	  short-­‐term	  relationships	  than	  long-­‐term	  relationships,	  are	  less	  discriminating	  in	  partners,	  and	  also	  engage	  in	  other	  deceptive	  behaviors	  that	  make	  them	  more	  successful	  at	  securing	  partners.	  26	  These	  facts	  go	  a	  long	  way	  in	  explaining	  why	  they	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  sexual	  partners	  than	  neuro-­‐typicals.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  manipulative	  exploitative	  social	  style	  and	  superficial	  charm	  characteristic	  of	  the	  dark	  triad	  helps	  these	  individuals	  to	  make	  positive	  initial	  impressions.	  27	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  wouldn’t	  expect	  vice	  to	  be	  on	  full	  display	  in	  the	  earliest	  stages	  of	  getting	  to	  know	  someone.	  Even	  neuro-­‐typicals	  are	  on	  their	  best	  behavior,	  so-­‐to-­‐speak,	  when	  they	  meet	  a	  new	  potential	  partner.	  Those	  skilled	  in	  deception	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  particularly	  good	  at	  concealing	  vicious	  traits.	  Add	  to	  this	  that	  the	  personality	  styles	  we	  are	  referring	  to	  often	  come	  coupled	  with	  positive	  traits	  like	  extraversion	  and	  low-­‐neuroticism,	  and	  the	  appeal	  becomes	  more	  apparent.	  Deceptive	  individuals	  can	  also	  claim	  feelings	  or	  intentions	  that	  are	  insincere	  but	  effective	  in	  seduction.	  Some	  vicious	  traits	  might	  even	  initially	  present	  as	  virtues:	  narcissistic	  entitlement	  and	  self-­‐aggrandizement	  can	  falsely	  come	  off	  as	  confidence,	  impulsive	  behavior	  and	  lack	  of	  concern	  for	  consequences	  can	  look	  like	  courage,	  and	  desire	  for	  social	  dominance	  could	  initially	  seem	  to	  be	  strength	  or	  fortitude.	  28	  All	  of	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  helpful	  for	  securing	  short-­‐term	  relationships,	  though	  the	  appeal	  of	  such	  individuals	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  long-­‐lasting.	  	  	  In	  fact,	  rather	  than	  presenting	  a	  counter-­‐example	  to	  the	  view	  I	  have	  offered,	  considering	  the	  appeal	  of	  dark-­‐triad	  character	  traits	  can	  help	  us	  to	  hone	  in	  on	  the	  ways	  that	  our	  own	  character	  can	  facilitate,	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  impede	  our	  perception	  of	  virtue	  in	  others.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  possession	  of	  virtuous	  character	  traits	  can	  make	  us	  better	  detectors	  of	  virtue	  in	  others.	  But	  possession	  of	  perfect	  virtue	  is	  uncommon.	  Character	  traits	  come	  in	  degrees.	  An	  honest	  person	  may	  be	  generally	  truthful	  but	  fail	  to	  have	  the	  appropriate	  emotional	  response	  on	  some	  occasions	  and	  so	  sometimes	  fail	  to	  see	  in	  others	  what	  they	  themselves	  possess	  only	  imperfectly.	  But	  the	  more	  perfectly	  we	  embody	  our	  virtuous	  traits,	  this	  view	  predicts,	  the	  better	  we	  should	  become	  at	  detecting	  those	  traits	  in	  others.	  And	  on	  the	  flipside,	  the	  view	  predicts	  that	  the	  further	  from	  virtue	  our	  character	  deviates,	  the	  worse	  we	  would	  be	  at	  recognizing	  virtue.	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  this	  in	  fact	  bears	  out.	  Studies	  show	  that	  psychopathic	  individuals	  are	  the	  only	  group	  that	  shows	  preference	  for	  long-­‐term	  partners	  who	  also	  rate	  high	  for	  psychopathy.29	  One	  way	  of	  reading	  this	  is	  that	  psychopaths,	  unlike	  non-­‐psychopaths,	  do	  not	  adequately	  distinguish	  the	  virtuous	  from	  the	  vicious	  when	  selecting	  mating	  partners.	  In	  lacking	  virtue,	  they	  are	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poorer	  than	  average	  at	  detecting	  it	  in	  others.	  But	  their	  mistakes	  go	  beyond	  a	  failure	  of	  recognition.	  In	  esteeming	  others	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  vice	  they	  mistakenly	  represent	  negative	  traits	  as	  having	  positive	  value.	  Perhaps	  the	  further	  from	  perfect	  virtue	  our	  own	  character	  deviates,	  the	  bigger	  mistakes	  we	  are	  wont	  to	  make.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  virtues	  are	  a	  category	  of	  character	  traits	  that	  have	  positive	  value.	  When	  we	  esteem	  something,	  we	  represent	  it	  to	  have	  positive	  value.	  So	  esteeming	  a	  person	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  character	  traits	  is	  a	  way	  of	  apprehending	  virtuous	  character	  traits	  as	  virtues.30	  Moreover,	  these	  feelings	  of	  esteem	  directed	  at	  virtue	  are	  epistemically	  perception-­‐like	  in	  their	  role	  in	  causing,	  providing	  content	  for,	  and	  in	  justifying	  judgments	  about	  the	  moral	  properties	  associated	  with	  character.	  Finally,	  I	  have	  argued,	  our	  own	  moral	  character	  can	  facilitate	  our	  perception	  of	  virtue	  by	  causing	  us	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  right	  things,	  recognize	  the	  right	  behaviors,	  and	  have	  the	  right	  emotional	  responses	  to	  virtue	  in	  others.	  And	  that	  makes	  having	  moral	  virtue,	  epistemically	  as	  well	  as	  morally	  advantageous.	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  1	  For	  defense	  of	  the	  perceptual	  theory	  of	  emotion	  see	  Deonna	  (2006).	  Doring	  (2007),	  Johnston	  (2001),	  Prinz	  (2004),	  	  Tye	  (2008),	  Goldie	  (2009).	  2	  For	  more	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  irrational	  emotions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  perceptual	  2	  For	  more	  in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  irrational	  emotions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  perceptual	  and	  cognitive	  theories	  of	  emotion	  see	  Deonna	  and	  Teroni	  (2012)	  3	  See	  discussion	  in	  Nichols	  (2002)	  4	  Hare	  (1993);	  Eichler	  (1965);	  Joyce	  (2006);	  Kennet	  and	  Fine	  (2008)	  5	  Blair	  et.	  al.	  (2001)	  6	  as	  Neil	  Sinhababu	  observes,	  “without	  color	  experience	  one	  can	  only	  achieve	  a	  partial	  grasp	  of	  color	  concepts	  by	  sharing	  a	  public	  language	  with	  those	  who	  can	  see”	  Sinhababu	  (2017)	  7	  Haidt	  p.	  814	  (2001)	  8	  See	  also	  Prinz	  (2006)	  9	  Alternatively,	  some	  identify	  related	  emotions	  with	  moral	  judgments.	  For	  instance	  see,	  Prinz	  (2006)	  10	  Brentano	  p.	  11	  (1969)	  11	  Brentano	  p.	  90(1973)	  12	  Velleman	  p.	  360	  (1999)	  13	  Oddie	  p.	  77	  (2005)	  14	  Lewandowski.	  et.	  al.	  (2007)	  15	  Kniffin	  et.	  al.	  (2004)	  16	  See,	  for	  example	  Foot's Natural Goodness and Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics 17	  This	  view	  is	  put	  forward	  by	  Deonna	  and	  Teroni	  (2012).	  See	  especially	  Chapter	  4.	  18	  Deonna	  and	  Teroni	  (2012)	  See	  especially	  Chapter	  6	  &	  8.	  19	  Although	  this	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  an	  exhaustive	  defense	  of	  a	  naturalistic	  account	  of	  value	  and	  it’s	  emotional	  perception	  I	  think	  that	  it	  suggests	  that	  a	  promising	  account	  is	  available.	  20	  For	  example	  see	  Prinz	  2006,	  Nichols	  2002.	  21	  I	  am	  assuming	  that	  the	  trait	  of	  honesty	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  truthfulness.	  The	  honest	  person	  reveals	  only	  as	  much	  of	  the	  truth	  as	  is	  called	  for.	  22	  I	  am	  taking	  this	  concept	  to	  be	  gender	  neutral.	  Perhaps	  one	  female	  manifestation	  is	  the	  femme	  fatale.	  23	  This	  conclusion	  is	  drawn	  by	  Steve	  Conner	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  Independent,	  “Why	  Women	  really	  do	  love	  self-­‐obsessed	  psychopaths”	  24	  Jonaso	  et.	  al.	  (2009)	  25	  Holtzman	  &	  Strube	  (2012)	  26	  Jonason	  et.	  al.	  (2009)	  27	  Jonason	  et.	  al.	  (2009)	  28	  Positive	  traits	  associated	  with	  dark-­‐triad	  personality	  styles	  are	  discussed	  in	  Jonason	  et.	  al.	  (2009).	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  open	  question	  which	  positive	  traits	  associated	  with	  dark-­‐triad	  personalities	  are	  genuinely	  separate	  positive	  traits	  (i.e.	  extroversion)	  and	  which	  are	  vices	  that	  we	  mistake	  for	  virtues	  in	  conditions	  insufficient	  knowledge	  (i.e.	  where	  the	  drive	  for	  social	  dominance	  confers	  power.)	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  29	  Jonason	  et.	  al.	  (2015)	  30	  Again,	  I	  am	  happy	  to	  call	  this	  a	  case	  of	  quasi-­‐perception.	  I	  only	  intend	  to	  highlight	  the	  way	  in	  which	  emotion	  functions	  analogously	  to	  the	  way	  perception	  does	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  I	  have	  discussed.	  
